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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we look at the robustness of connected critical infrastructures under a 
systems-of-systems framework taking into account i) the dependencies and 
interdependencies among the components of a critical infrastructure and between 
different critical infrastructures, respectively; ii) the variability of the performance of 
each component by means of a multistate model; iii) the epistemic uncertainty in the 
transition probability between different components states by means of probability 
intervals. We adopt the Goal Tree Success Tree – Dynamic Master Logic Diagram 
for system modelling and we perform a quantitative assessment of the systems-of-
systems performance by Monte Carlo simulation. We illustrate the approach by way 
of a simplified case study consisting of two interdependent infrastructures (electric 
power system and a gas network) and a supervisory control and data acquisition 
system connected to the gas network.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Critical infrastructures, e.g., transportation, electric power, water, oil, gas and 
communication systems, interact on the basis of complex relationships that cross the 
single infrastructure boundary, increasing, in this way, the risk of their failure: 
actually, a failure of an infrastructure can significantly impact another one. For 
example, the widespread power electric blackout occurred in the Midwest and 
Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, on August 2003, affected the 
serviceability of the water system at Cleveland, OH, due to the lack of power needed 
to the water pumping stations to operate [Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008]. In addition, 
critical infrastructures are getting more and more dependent on information 
technologies that, on one hand, provide control and support to them increasing their 
efficiency, but, on the other hand, create new vulnerabilities [Nozick et al., 2005]. 
Understanding these interdependences between infrastructure systems is fundamental 
to the well-functioning of these “systems of systems”.  
Under a systems-of-systems framework of analysis, we wish to estimate the systems-
of-systems performance, in terms of robustness, considering the dependencies and 
interdependencies among the components of a critical infrastructure and between 
different critical infrastructures, respectively. For a more realistic representation, we 
adopt a multistate model where different degrees of damage of the individual 
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components are contemplated [Ferrario and Zio, 2013]: transitions between these 
different states of damage occur stochastically. In addition, we take into account the 
epistemic uncertainty affecting the transition probabilities between different states, 
due to the lack of knowledge and information on the system: actually, in many 
reliability assessments of safety-critical infrastructures, few observations of the 
system failure behavior are available and thus it is difficult to estimate their levels of 
damage and the precise values of the corresponding transition probabilities [Sallak et 
al., 2013].  
For illustration purposes, we adopt the case study proposed by [Nozick et al., 2005], 
consisting of two interdependent infrastructures (gas and electric power networks) 
and a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system connected to the gas 
network. As a measure of the robustness of the system, we determine the steady-state 
probability distributions of the supply of gas and electricity at the demand nodes. 
We propose a hierarchical model description by Goal Tree Success Tree – Dynamic 
Master Logic Diagram (GTST-DMLD) [Hu and Modarres, 1999], extending its 
representation characteristics to evaluate the physical flows of gas and electricity 
through the interdependent infrastructures. We adopt intervals to describe the 
epistemic uncertainty in the probabilities of transition between different components 
states and we use interval analysis to calculate the (uncertain) probabilities of the 
states of all the components of the critical infrastructures [Buckley, 2004]. Finally, 
we employ Monte Carlo simulation [Kalos, 1986; Zio, 2013] for the probabilistic 
evaluation of systems-of-systems performance. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the case study is 
presented; in Section 3, the systems-of-systems modelling by Goal Tree Success 
Tree - Dynamic Master Logic Diagram is illustrated; in Section 4, details of the 
procedural steps to evaluate the systems-of-systems performance under epistemic 
uncertainty are given; in Section 5, the results of the analysis are shown and 
commented; in Section 6, conclusions are provided. 
2. CASE STUDY 
The case study is taken from [Nozick et al., 2005] and deals with two interconnected 
infrastructures, i.e., a natural gas distribution network and an electricity 
generation/distribution network (Figure 1, solid and dashed lines, respectively). The 
gas distribution network is supported by a supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) system (Figure 1, dotted lines). The objective of these interconnected 
systems of systems is to provide the necessary amount of gas and electricity 
(hereafter also called “product”) to four demand nodes (end-nodes), namely D1 and 
D2 (gas) and L1 and L2 (electricity).  
The gas distribution network, supplied by two sources of gas (namely, S1 and S2, 
that are connected to the network by arcs S1_DS1 and S2_DS2, respectively) 
provides gas to the end-nodes D1 and D2 and to two nodes of the electricity network 
(E1 and E2). Once the gas enters into nodes E1 and E2, it is transformed into 
electrical energy that flows through arcs E1_G1 and E2_G2 (representing the electric 
power generation stations) to supply the end-nodes of electricity (L1 and L2); notice 
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that the demand L2 can be supplied by both electrical generations E1_G1 and 
E2_G2. The assumption is made that the gas-electricity transformation occurs with a 
constant coefficient, i.e., 100 cu. ft. of natural gas produces 1 MWh of electricity 
[Nozick et al., 2005].  
A SCADA system controls the gas flow through arcs a_b, b_c, c_d and d_e. It is 
assumed that: i) the SCADA has two core subsystems controlling different sets of 
arcs (in particular, the first one – SUB1 – refers to links a_b and b_c, whereas the 
second one – SUB2 – controls arcs c_d and d_e); ii) the SCADA is always provided 
by electric power [Nozick et al., 2005]. 
 
Figure 1: Interdependent gas (solid-black lines) and electric (dashed lines) 
infrastructures and SCADA system (dotted lines) [Nozick et al., 2005].  
The capacities of the arcs of the gas and electricity network (determining the 
maximum flows of gas or electricity supported by the arc) can be deterministic (i.e., 
fixed constant values) or stochastic (i.e., randomly evolving in time) (Figure 1, 
values in the square brackets). The stochastic capacities give rise to a multistate 
model that reflects the possibly different degrees of damage of the arc. On the 
contrary, the SCADA system state is defined by a binary random variable, whose 
values 1 and 0 represent its complete and partial functioning, respectively. For 
example, when the state of the SCADA subsystem SUB1 (controlling arcs a_b and 
b_c) is 0, the capacity of these arcs decreases because of the incorrect information 
provided by the SCADA subsystem (even if the arcs are not subject to a direct 
damage). On the basis of the two states of the SCADA subsystems, two different 
vectors of capacities are identified for each arc a_b, b_c, c_d and d_e: as illustrated 
in Figure 1, the first vector is used when the corresponding SCADA subsystem is in 
state 0, whereas the second one is utilized when the SCADA subsystem is in state 1. 
In the following, we generically denote the value of the state of a component (i.e., the 
capacity of the arcs) as ζcomp,i , i  {1,2,…,Scomp}, where the subscript ‘comp’ 
indicates the component of interest and Scomp is the total number of states for that 
component. For example, component S1_DS1 has SS1_DS1 = 4 possible states: ζS1_DS1,1 
= 90 [1000 cu. ft.], ζS1_DS1,2 = 95 [1000 cu. ft.], ζS1_DS1,3 = 100 [1000 cu. ft.], ζS1_DS1,4 
= 105 [1000 cu. ft.]. The total number of components in the systems of systems is 
referred to as Ncomp. 
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Changes in the arc capacities are due to random failures or recovery actions. The 
state transitions over time are modeled by Markov and semi-Markov processes as in 
[Nozick et al., 2005]. Semi-Markov processes are adopted to represent the evolution 
of the capacities of the gas supply links (S1_DS1 and S2_DS2), whereas Markov 
processes are used for all the others arcs. Both Markov and semi-Markov processes 
for a generic component ‘comp’ are defined by a transition probability matrix 
}..., ,2 ,1, :{P compij Sjipcomp  , where pij is the one-step probability of transition 
from state i to state j. In addition, the semi-Markov processes are characterized by 
continuous probability distributions for the holding time T
ij
comp, i.e., for the time of 
residence in state i before performing a transition to state j.  
Differently from [Nozick et al., 2005], we take into account the epistemic uncertainty 
affecting the transition probabilities and the holding time distributions of the Markov 
and semi-Markov processes, respectively. In particular, intervals,  ],[ ijij pp , i,j = 1, 
…, Scomp, (instead of fixed constant values) are used to describe the state transition 
probabilities for both Markov and semi-Markov processes (matrices compP , comp = 
S1_DS1, S2_DS2, a_b, b_c, c_d d_e, SCADA, E1_G1 and E2_G2, in Figure 2 with 
respect to the states defined in Figure 1). The holding time distributions for the semi-
Markov process are considered normal with epistemically-uncertain mean (described 
by an interval) and fixed standard deviation (matrices compT , comp = S1_DS1, 
S2_DS2, in Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Holding time distributions (matrices compT ) for the arcs described by 
semi-Markov processes and state transition probability matrices ( compP ) for the 
arcs described by Markov and semi-Markov processes. 
In the present work, the demand nodes are not given the same importance: in 
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particular, D1 is more important than L1; on its turn, L1 is more important than both 
D2 and L2 (which instead are equally important). These assumptions are made to 
illustrate and motivate the repartition of electricity and gas flows in the network, as 
represented in the Goal Tree Success Tree - Dynamic Master Logic Diagram given in 
the next Section 3. 
The objective of the analysis is to determine the cumulative distribution functions of 
the product delivered to the demand nodes (i.e., D1, D2, L1, L2) at steady state. 
Since the state transition probabilities of the network components are affected by 
epistemic uncertainty, described by intervals,  ],[ ijij pp , i,j = 1, …, Scomp, the 
corresponding component steady-state probabilities are also affected by epistemic 
uncertainty and represented by intervals of possible values, [ icompicomp ,max
,
min , ], i = 1, 
…, Scomp. As a consequence, a set of cumulative distribution functions corresponding 
to the set of possible steady-state probabilities within the intervals [ icompicomp ,max
,
min , ], 
i = 1, …, Scomp, is obtained for each demand node.  
3. SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS MODELLING 
3.1. GTST-DMLD: basic concepts 
The Goal Tree Success Tree – Dynamic Master Logic Diagram (GTST-DMLD) is a 
goal-oriented method based on a hierarchical framework [Hu and Modarres, 1999]. It 
gives a comprehensive knowledge of the system describing the complex physical 
systems in terms of functions (qualities), objects (parts) and their relationships 
(interactions). The first part is developed by the Goal Tree (GT), the second one by 
the Success Tree (ST) and the third one by the DMLD [Hu and Modarres, 1999]. 
In extreme synthesis, the GT identifies the hierarchy of the qualities of the system 
decomposing the objective of the analysis, i.e., the goal, into functions that are in 
turn divided into other functions and so on by answering the question “how” they can 
attain the parent function (looking from top to bottom of the hierarchy) and “why” 
the functions are needed (looking from bottom to top of the hierarchy) [Brissaud et 
al., 2011]. The ST represents the hierarchy of the objects of the system from the 
whole system to the parts necessary to attain the last levels of the GT. This hierarchy 
is built identifying the elements that are “part of” the parent objects [Brissaud et al., 
2011]. The DMLD is an extension of the Master Logic Diagram (MLD) [Hu and 
Modarres, 1999] to model the dynamic behavior of a physical system. It identifies 
the interactions between parts, functions and parts and functions, in the form of a 
dependency matrix and it adds the dynamic aspect by introducing time-dependent 
fuzzy logic [Hu and Modarres, 1999].  
3.2. GTST-DMLD for interconnected networked infrastructures  
In this Section, we adapt the GTST-DMLD presented in Section 3.1 for the 
representation of interconnected networked infrastructures. In particular, we 
introduce new concepts in order to highlight in the diagram not only the dependency 
relations between the components, but also the ways in which the flows of gas and 
electricity are partitioned into the network on the basis of i) the importance of the 
demand nodes, ii) the amount of product necessary to satisfy each demand, iii) the 
constraints of the arc capacities, and iv) the information provided by the SCADA 
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system. In the following, first we explain the notation adopted in the GTST-DMLD 
and, then, we apply it to the case study of interest. 
First of all, since in the present work we are interested in analyzing the flows passing 
through the network, the input and output of an arc are flows and the output is 
(generally) the sum of the flow inputs. This situation is represented by a “+” in the 
middle of an “AND” gate, as shown in the example of Figure 3 a. where the flows of 
arcs A and B enter into arc C. 
With respect to the dependency relations, we distinguish between three main types: 
direct, indirect and constraint-based dependencies, as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. 
The first ones, pictorially represented by dots and hereafter called "dot-
dependencies", express the fact that the product of the element on the bottom passes 
straightly into the element on the top. The indirect dependencies, represented by 
hexagons and called hereafter “hexagon dependencies”, are instead needed for the 
optimal allocation of the product in the network: for example, they are used to 
describe those cases where the flow exceedance in an arc can be better partitioned 
into another arc that is not directly connected to it but that shares one of the inputs 
(see the example of Figure 3 b). Finally, the constraint-based dependencies, depicted 
by triangles and hereafter called "triangle-dependencies", are employed to take into 
account some physical constraints posed by the problem, like the maximum flow 
required by a demand node. 
For clarity of illustration, in Figure 3, examples of two types of dot- and hexagon- 
dependencies are given, with respect to different graph representations. Figure 3 a. 
shows the dependence of arc C on two input arcs A and B: arc C receives all the 
input products from A and B; this complete direct dependence is depicted by a black 
dot. Figures 3 b. and c. describe the same "physical" situation (i.e., an input arc A 
and two output arcs B and C), but with different relative importances of the arcs. 
Two different cases are illustrated. In the first case (Figure 3 b.), arc B is more 
important than C: thus, in this situation, the flow from A supplies first arc B until its 
demand is satisfied, and then arc C. In the second case (Figure 3 c.), arcs B and C are 
equally important: thus, the input flow (A) is divided into equal parts on the basis of 
the number of output arcs (i.e., two in this example). In the case of Figure 3 b., the 
flow that enters in C is given by the difference between the entire flow from A and 
the flow given to B; to represent and compute this difference in the DMLD, the 
hexagon-dependency is adopted to correct the black dot-dependency from arc A to 
arc C (in fact, it is impossible that the entire flow of A enters at the same time in the 
arcs B and C as expressed by the black dot-dependency). The white hexagon assumes 
the value of the flow in B with a negative sign; this value is then summed to the 
initial flow of A to obtain the flux to C. The flow given to B can be the entire flow of 
A or a lower value depending on the constraints and arc capacity (see the following 
example in Figure 4). In the case of Figure 3 c., the flow from A is divided into equal 
parts: this condition is represented by a grey dot. However, this equal partition of the 
flow may not represent the optimal one, since some output arcs may require less flow 
than the one allocated according to this criterion. Thus, to optimize the repartition of 
the flow, hexagon-dependencies are adopted: they are directed from an output arc to 
all the other output arcs that share the same input. In this case, the “surplus flow” is a 
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positive quantity and it is represented by a grey hexagon (to distinguish it from the 
“negative” white hexagon of the example in Figure 3 b). 
Notice that the graph representation of Figures 3 b. and 3 c. are identical; however, 
the partition of the flux from A is completely different in the two cases: this means 
that the graph representation alone cannot be used to describe the repartition of the 
flows in the network according to different criteria. On the contrary, the DMLD can 
capture and depict this aspect, that is useful in the quantitative evaluation of the 
system performance. 
 
Figure 3: Examples of dot- and hexagon-dependencies with respect to possible 
graph representations. 
In Figure 4, examples of two types of triangle-dependencies are given, with respect 
to different possible graph representations. Figure 4 a. depicts the same situation as 
Figure 3 a. with an additional arc D whose behavior impacts on the state of arc C 
(however, notice that D is not an input to C). This dependency is represented by a 
grey triangle and it means that the output of C can be modified on the basis of the 
state of arc D. In the present case study, this constraint-based dependency is used to 
model the SCADA system that can decrease the actual flow of the controlled arc if it 
is in a damage state. Figure 4 b. represents the same situation of Figure 3 c. with the 
addition of another arc (D) sequential to arc C. In this case, the capacity (or the 
demand) of arc D can limit the amount of flow in input to arc C. This constraint is 
represented in the DMLD by a black triangle and it is needed to control the input 
flow partitioned in different arcs and guarantee that it is not higher than necessary. 
 
Figure 4: Examples of triangle-dependencies with respect to possible graph 
representations. 
Finally, another type of constraint is taken into account, i.e., the one related to the 
capacity of the arcs: when the flow in input to an arc is higher than the capacity of 
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the arc itself, the output flow will be equal to the capacity of the arc. The arc capacity 
can be deterministic or stochastic and in the GTST-DMLD it is represented by a grey 
or dot-filled rectangular, respectively (see Figure 5). 
In Figure 5, the GTST-DMLD of the case study of Section 2 is shown. 
 
Figure 5: GTST-DMLD of the case study with respect to the graph of Figure 1. 
The Goal Tree, on the top, represents the main goal of the systems of systems that is 
related to the supply of the demands of gas and electricity. The objective is achieved 
if the corresponding nodes D1, D2, L1 and L2 receive the required amont of gas and 
electricity, respectively. In the present case study, we limit the analysis to the last 
level of the GT, i.e., we analyze the performance of each demand, without 
investigating a global indicator of the systems of systems.  
The Success Tree is composed by the main hierarchies of gas and electricity 
networks (that directly provide the demand nodes with gas and electricity to achieve 
the goal function) and by the support hierarchy of the SCADA system (that is needed 
for the control of the gas network and, therefore, it is not directly involved in the 
achievement of the goal function). Given its support role, it is represented in a 
parallel dashed branch connected to the gas hierarchy.  
The DMLD is represented by the relationships between objects of the ST or between 
objects of the ST and functions of the GT. It allows determining the goal function by 
the evaluation of all the dependencies from the bottom to the top of the diagram, 
following the rules explained above for the dot-, hexagon- and triangle- 
dependencies. For example, arc a_b depends on two arcs, DS1_a and DS2_b, 
connected by black dot-dependencies (Figure 5). Thus, the output of a_b is given by 
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the sum of the corresponding input values, i.e., DS1_a + DS2_b. This value may, 
then, be modified by the triangle constraint of the SCADA system and by the 
(stochastic) capacity of arc a_b itself.  
4. SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this Section, we illustrate the algorithm adopted to evaluate the performance of the 
systems of systems described in Section 2, in the presence of epistemic uncertainties 
in the components state transition probabilities (represented by intervals). As already 
mentioned in Section 2, the system performance is quantified in terms of the steady-
state probability distributions of the product delivered at the demand nodes. The 
algorithm consists of the following three main steps: 
1. Processing the epistemic uncertainties by interval analysis: this step leads to the 
evaluation of the intervals of the steady-state probabilities, [ icompicomp ,max
,
min , ], i = 
1, 2, ..., Scomp, for the states of each component (comp = 1, 2, ..., Ncomp) of the 
systems of systems. 
2. Evaluation of the systems-of-systems performance by Monte Carlo simulation: 
this step leads to the determination of a set of cumulative distribution functions 
(CDFs) of the product delivered at each demand node at steady state, one for each 
possible combination of steady-state probabilities ranging within the intervals [
icompicomp ,
max
,
min , ], i = 1, 2, ..., Scomp, (found at step 1. above).  
3. Post-processing the results obtained at the previous step 2: this step leads to the 
identification of two extreme upper and lower CDFs that bound the set of CDFs 
produced at step 2. above. 
5. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the upper and lower probabilities that the product delivered at steady 
state to the demand nodes, D1, D2, L1 and L2, exceeds the following threshold 
values: d1* = 95 [1000 cu. ft.], d2* = 75 [1000 cu. ft.], l1* = 475 [MWh] and l2* = 
375 [MWh] (i.e., the probabilities that the corresponding demands are satisfied). 
Table 1: lower and upper probabilities that the product delivered to the demand 
nodes (D1, D2, L1 and L2) exceeds the corresponding requested threshold value. 
D1  d1* = 95 [1000 cu. ft.] 
[lower, upper] 
D2  d2* = 75 [1000 cu. ft.] 
[lower, upper] 
L1  l1* = 475 [MWh] 
[lower, upper] 
L2  l2* = 375 [MWh] 
[lower, upper] 
[0.971, 1] [0.450, 0.780] [0.963, 1] [0.929, 0.992] 
It can be seen that, in general, the probability of satisfying demand nodes D1 and L1 
is higher than for nodes D2 and L2: their threshold values are satisfied, in the worst 
case, with probability equal to 0.971 and 0.963, respectively. On the contrary, node 
D2 is the least supplied: the upper and lower probabilities that the product delivered 
to it exceeds the corresponding threshold value are low, i.e., 0.450 and 0.780, 
respectively. This is due to the fact that node D2 can be satisfied by only one path 
that presents high epistemic uncertainty in the arc capacities (a_b, b_c, c_d and d_e). 
On the contrary node L2, is satisfied with probability between 0.929 and 0.992 even 
if it is the farthest node from the input sources (and, thus, more affected by 
uncertainties in the arc capacities): this is due to the presence of two redundant paths 
that allow its supply by arcs E1_G1 and E2_G2. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have considered systems of systems made of interdependent 
infrastructures and proposed a modelling framework to evaluate the robustness 
taking into account i) the dependencies and interdependencies among the 
components of a critical infrastructure and between different critical infrastructures, 
respectively, ii) the variability in the states of the components (by adopting a 
multistate model), and iii) the epistemic uncertainty in the transition probabilities 
between different components states (by interval analysis).  
For exemplification, we have performed an analysis of interconnected gas and 
electricity networks, with a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
system connected to the gas network, by using the Goal Tree Success Tree – 
Dynamic Master Logic Diagram for system modeling and Monte Carlo simulation 
for the quantitative evaluation of performance at steady state. The results obtained 
can help to improve the global systems-of-systems performance by improving the 
structural response of specific arcs that more easily turns into damage states or by 
developing a more redundant network that allows the supply of the product from 
different paths. 
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